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Whereas existing OLG models with endogenous longevity neglect the impact of environmental 
quality on mortality, this paper studies the design of the optimal public intervention in a two-
period  OLG  model  where  longevity  is  influenced  positively  by  health  expenditures,  but 
negatively by pollution due to production. It is shown that if individuals, when choosing how 
much  to  spend  on  health,  do  not  internalize  the  impact  of  their  decision  on  environmental 
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The simultaneous growth of economic activity and longevity observed during
t h el a s tt w oc e n t u r i e si ni n d u s t r i a l i z e dc o u n t r i e sh a sr a i s e dt h ei s s u eo ft h e
relationship between those two phenomena. In the recent years, the study
of interactions between economic development and longevity has been par-
ticularly enriched by OLG models with endogenous longevity (Chakraborty,
2004; Bhattacharya and Qiao, 2005; Zhang et al, 2006). But those models,
by making longevity depend on (private and/or public) health expenditures
only, tend to neglect the inﬂuence of the natural environment on longevity.
However, as this was emphasized by demographers (see Sartor, 2001), the
natural environment constitutes a major determinant of longevity. Environ-
mental quality aﬀects longevity through various channels: the climate — i.e.
temperature (Kunst et al, 1993) and solar radiations (Elwood et al, 1974) —
the quality of lands (Kjellström, 1986), of waters (Sartor and Rondia, 1983)
and of the air (Kinney and Ozkanyak, 1991).
Given that environmental determinants of longevity are signiﬁcantly in-
ﬂuenced by economic activity, introducing the environment in the analysis
can contribute to reﬁne the study of the relationship between economic ac-
tivity and longevity, which is assumed, in existing models, to be merelly
‘globally positive’. Although including environmental quality does not ques-
tion the positive relationship observed, this may, however, be most relevant
for public policy analysis, because actual policies may be non-optimal: the
observed production and longevity levels may, under actual interactions be-
tween production, environment and longevity, diﬀer from what would maxi-
mize lifetime welfare.
The goal of this paper is to examine the issue of the optimal public in-
tervention in a two-period OLG economy, in which the length of the second
period of life is inﬂuenced not only by private health expenditures, but, also,
by environmental quality. For that purpose, environmental quality shall enter
our model in two distinct ways, each of these involving speciﬁc externalities,
which can partially oﬀset each others.
First, the production process is assumed to generate polluting emissions,
whose negative eﬀects on longevity are not taken into account by producers.
The stock of pollution at each point in time, depending on the stock of
pollution at the previous period and on current polluting emissions, tends
to lower longevity, and, as such, accounts for the — widely documented —
negative impact of the pollution of land, waters and the air on longevity.
Second, environmental quality is assumed to inﬂuence welfare not only
indirectly, through the eﬀects of pollution on longevity, but, also, directly,
t h r o u g ht h eq u a n t i t yo fs p a c ea v a i l a b l ef o re a c hp e r s o n .I ti sh e r ep o s t u l a t e d
2that individuals, when choosing their health spending, do not internalize the
impact of their decisions on the number of persons.1 G i v e nt h a tt h ee a r t hi s ,
in Boulding’s (1966) terms, nothing else than a ‘spaceship’, such an external-
ity may have strong welfare consequences.2 The ﬁniteness of the earth can
aﬀect welfare either indirectly, through the constraints it imposes on produc-
tion possibilities, or directly, through the welfare loss due to overcrowding.
While the constraints imposed by the ﬁniteness of the earth on production
are generally regarded as negligible (see Heilig, 1994), recent empirical stud-
ies showed that population density has, even if one controls for income and
education, a negative direct eﬀect on the subjective quality of life (see Cramer
et al, 2004). Hence, agents, if they ignore that the lengthening of their life
may cause — under the limiteness of the ‘spaceship’ — undesirable crowding
eﬀects, may tend to overspend in health.
What is interesting here is that these two external eﬀects can partially oﬀ-
set each others. Pollution hurts longevity, which can be desirable if longevity
decisions do not internalize their eﬀects on environmental quality. The exis-
tence of those two partially oﬀsetting externalities raises the question of what
public intervention should be: under those externalities, should a government
tax or subsidize revenues from production and health expenditures?
This paper aims at casting a new light on the normative study of the
growth-longevity relationship, by examining the optimal public intervention
in an OLG economy where those two externalities are present.
For that purpose, we shall, for analytical convenience, assume that fer-
tility is exogenous and ﬁxed. That way to proceed is unusual, as numbers
problems are often treated by focussing on the beginning - rather than the
end - of the demographic chain. However, it should be stressed that the
usual focus on fertility can hardly be justiﬁed on the grounds of a higher
controllability of births, but, rather, relies on ethical reasons. Controlling
numbers via births - i.e. through potential lives that do not exist yet - is
obviously more acceptable than controlling numbers via deaths - i.e. through
existing lives -. Hence, overpopulation issues must undoubtedly be tackled
through fertility rather than mortality. Nevertheless, given that longevity
suﬃces to introduce a population externality, it is analytically convenient,
for our purpose, to abstract from fertility, and to concentrate on interactions
between production, environment and longevity under a ﬁxed fertility.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The
1Actually, the same externalities appear in fertility decision, which involves the well-
known tragedy of the commons: with ﬁxed natural resources, free riding agents adopt a
too high fertility rate. In the present context, free riding agents tend to live too long.
2Boulding’s (1966) expression means that the earth is a spaceship without illimited
reservoirs of anything, so that man must ﬁnd his place in a cyclical ecological system.
3steady-state is characterized in Section 3. The decentralization of the social
optimum is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 analyses the second best policy,
whose sensitivity is studied numerically in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a two-period overlapping generations model with endogenous
longevity and unpriced pollution.
2.1 Firms and pollution
We assume the existence of a neo-classical production sector using a quantity
K of capital and L of labor. We assume, for simplicity, that capital fully
depreciates during the process of production. At each time t, ﬁrms produce
a good (Yt) with a well-behaved production function,
Yt = F(Kt,L t) (1)
Within the framework of a competitive equilibrium, each ﬁrm, at time t,
chooses the quantity of capital and labor which will maximize its proﬁt,
πt = F(Kt,L t) − RtKt − wtLt (2)
At equilibrium, the levels of return from the inputs correspond respectively
to their marginal productivity:
Rt = FK(Kt,L t) (3)
wt = FL(Kt,L t) (4)
where Rt i st h ei n t e r e s tr a t ef o rs a v i n g sa n dwt the wage rate.
At each period, the ﬂow of pollution emission is equal to a proportion η of
current production,
Et = ηF(Kt,L t) (5)
The dynamics of the stock of pollution at time t, Pt,i sd e ﬁned by
Pt =( 1− δ)Pt−1 + Et (6)
where δ the natural level of pollution absorption, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
42.2 Agents
We suppose that the population is constant, and that at each time t, N
identical agents are born. Each agent lives through two life periods. He or
she works during the ﬁrst period of life and is a pensioner for the second
period of life.
The ﬁrst period is of unitary length; the second period lasts a period
h,i n f e r i o rt o1, which can be increased through health spending xt (like
primary prevention in ﬁrst period), and decreased by industrial pollution in
the second period Pt+1 (see Evans and Smith, 2005). The longevity function,
h(xt,P t+1), is strictly concave with hx > 0, hxx < 0, hP < 0, hPP > 0.
Any agent born in period t derives utility from consumption, ct and the
amount of space or land per person, qt,i nh e r / h i sﬁrst period of life and
from consumption, dt+1, and the amount of space or land per person, qt+1,
in her/his second period of life.
The preferences of the agents are represented by a utility function, U(ct,q t)+
h(xt,P t+1)U(dt+1,q t+1) where qt = Q/N(1+h(xt−1,P t)) with Q the given to-
tal quantity of space. U(.) is supposed to be strictly concave with Ui > 0
(for i = c,d), Uq > 0 and the cross derivative is assumed to be non negative,
Uiq ≥ 0.3
During the ﬁrst period of life, each agent supplies one inelastic unit of
labor and receives the wage, wt, which he or she consumes, ct and saves st
in the form of capital and spend xt for health.
L e tu si n t r o d u c eat a xξ on health spending and a tax τ on capital income,
along with a lump-sum subsidy a. The budget constraint in the ﬁrst period
of life is:
wt + a = ct + st +( 1+ξ)xt (7)
In the second period of life, the agents receive the return of their saving,
Rt+1st and consume dt+1 during h(xt,P t+1). The budget constraint in the
second period of life of an agent born in t is therefore:
h(xt,P t+1)dt+1 =( Rt+1 − τ)st. (8)
The problem of each individual is thus to maximize:
U(ct,q t)+h(xt,P t+1)U(dt+1,q t+1)
3This assumption converts a complementary eﬀect of space and consumption. An
alternative assumption is that space and consumption are substitutable, a negative crossed
derivative. For an in-depth discussion of these assumptions we refer the reader to Michel
and Rotillon (1995).
5subject to (7) and (8) by choosing xt and st. What is crucial is that, when
choosing xt and st, individuals do not perceive the eﬀect of their decisions on
the environmental variables: pollution and space. Since the individual does
not see the eﬀect of savings on pollution, nor the eﬀect of health spending
on total population N(1+h(xt,P t+1)), one obtains the ﬁrst order conditions
for savings
−Uct +( Rt+1 − τ)Udt+1 =0 , (9)
and for health spending
−(1 + ξ)Uct + hxtU(dt+1,q t+1) − dt+1hxtUdt+1 =0 (10)
3 Equilibrium and steady state
3.1 Intertemporal equilibrium
The intertemporal equilibrium is deﬁned, by a sequence of prices, individual
variables and aggregate variables satisfying all the equilibrium conditions.
Firms maximize their proﬁt (conditions (19) and (20) hold) and consumers
their utility (conditions (9) and (10) hold).
The capital stock is equal to savings,
Kt = Nst−1 (11)
The market of labor clears,
Lt = N, (12)
as well the market of goods,
Yt = F(Kt,N)=Nct + Nxt + Nh(xt−1,P t)dt + Kt+1 (13)
In addition, the dynamic equation of pollution holds.
Pt =( 1− δ)Pt−1 + ηF(Kt,N) (14)
At time 0, consumption of the retirees satisﬁes:
h(x−1,P 0)d0 = R0s−1. (15)
Further we take for given the initial capital stock K0 = Ns−1, the pollution
stock P−1 a n dh e a l t he x p e n d i t u r ex−1.
63.2 Stationary equilibrium
At the steady state with a given policy, the stock of capital is given by the
sum of saving, K = Ns and the economy’s resource constraint per young is,
f(k)=c + x + h(x,P)d + k (16)
where k = K/N is the capital per young and f(k)=F(k,1). Long-run





The amount of space or land per person is deﬁned by,
q =
Q
N [1 + h(x,P)]
(18)




w = f(k) − kf
0(k) (20)
The optimal consumers’ decisions are given by,
−Uc +( R − τ)Ud =0 (21)
and for health spending
−(1 + ξ)Uc + hxU(d,q) − dhxUd =0 (22)
4 Social Optimum and optimal policy
We now turn to the analysis of the social optimum and optimal policy. At
the long-run equilibrium, we are looking for the maximum possible utility in
the economy.
4.1 Social optimum
In a centralized economy, the objective of the central planner is to maximize
the welfare of the agents by choosing the level of consumptions (c,d),h e a l t h
7spending (x) and the level of capital (k), under constraints of resources,















Denoting by λ the Lagrangian multiplier of resource constraint (16), the






























One obtains thereby the ﬁrst order conditions,
Uc = λ (24)
Ud = λ (25)
hxU(d,q) −
NQhx
[N (1 + h(x,P))]










(N [1 + h(x,P)])2µ (27)






where µ ≡ Uq(c,q)+h(x,P)Uq(d,q) is the marginal lifetime utility of an
increase in q.4
From (24) and (25) we obtain,
Uc = Ud (28)
4Note that if there is separability between consumption and q,
N ¯ Q
(N (1 + h))
2µ = v0 (q)q
with U(c,q)=u(c)+v(q).
8Using (28), (26) and (27), we have























Note that without the environmental variables, these two optimal conditions
would reduce to:




The ﬁr s te q u a t i o ni se q u i v a l e n tt o( 2 2 )w i t hξ =0 . As to the second, it is
the Golden rule (population growth is here 0).
W i t ht h ee n v i r o n m e n t a lv a r i a b l e ,w eh a v es o m ee x t e r n a l i t i e s .S t a r t i n g
with (29) associated with health spending, the externality comes from the
fact that individuals do not internalize in their decisions the eﬀect of increased
longevity on the number of inhabitants of a ﬁnite earth.
The choice of investment (eq. (30)) entails two externalities. The ﬁrst one
is positive. Keeping in mind that investment, production and pollution are
closely related, more capital means more pollution and thus less population,
which is good for the quality of the environment. The second externality is
negative: more pollution means lower longevity and thus lower utility in the









This implies that the optimum level of capital accumulation should be lower
than that corresponding to the standard golden rule level. In other words,
the negative externality more than oﬀsets the positive one.5
4.2 Optimal policy
Contrasting the market solution with the ﬁrst-best optimum, one sees that
the social optimum can be decentralized with appropriate choices of “Pigou-
5Note that, under






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ > 1, (30’) would imply that the marginal productivity of
capital at the social optimum is negative. On the contrary, we shall assume, in the rest of
this paper, that






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ < 1.






















To these two taxes one should add an intergenerational transfer device that
leads to R − τ =1from (28).6 With our environmental externality, we thus
have f0 (k)=R>1. In other words, the optimal level of capital stock is
inferior to that consistent with the standard Golden Rule (f0 (k)=1 ).
5 Second-best policy
We now turn to the second-best setting. We assume that both τ and ξ are
a v a i l a b l eb u tt h a tw ed on o th a v ea ni n s t r u m e n tt oa c h i e v et h eo p t i m a ll e v e l
of capital accumulation. We conduct this second-best analysis in a steady-
state framework.
With a zero population growth, we have s = k. We can easily show that
the resource constraint implies the revenue constraint
f (k)=c + x + hd + k
= f
0 (k)k + c + x(1 + ξ)+s − a
and thus,
a = τs+ ξx,
where a is a lump-sum transfer given in the ﬁrst period of life. Note that
if, besides a, we had also a transfer in the second period of life, one would
get the ﬁrst-best, with ξ and τ having the values (31) and (32) and the tax
transfers leading to f0 (k) − τ =1 .
We will express the problem of the social planner using the revenue con-
straint and not the resource constraint. To keep the notation simple, we






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ < 1 (see supra).
10assume N =1without loss of generality. The Lagrangian expression can






















where γ and µ are the multipliers associated with the revenue constraint and
with the deﬁnition of q.
We maximize L with respect to τ,ξ and a, our tax parameters and with
respect to q, an adjustment variable.
The FOC’s are given by:
∂L
∂a



































































































= Uq (c,q)+hUq (d,q) − µ =0 (33)
As usual with this type of problem, we express the tax formula in com-
pensated terms. In other words, an increase in either τ or ξ is compensated
by an increase in a and we want to know the eﬀect of such a compensated in-
crease on social welfare. We use the superscript c to denote the compensated























































































We distinguish among ﬁve terms in those two conditions:
1. the traditional Ramsey formula,
2. the gap between the (net) rate of interest and the population growth
rate,
3. the crowding eﬀect induced by longevity-enhancing investment,
4. the decrowding eﬀect induced by pollution,
5. the utility loss arising from shorter lifetime induced by pollution.
To get further insight, we make a quite extreme assumption: the cross-
derivatives are negligible. In other words, τ has no inﬂuence over x and ξ















































Starting with τ, we have two positive terms: [2] and [5] and two negative
ones [1] and [4]. The terms [2] and [4] are standard. The term [5] reﬂects
12t h ef a c tt h a tb yi n c r e a s i n gτ, there is less capital accumulation and thus less
pollution, which leads to an increased longevity and thus to an increased
utility in period two. The term [4] shows also that a tax on saving has a
positive eﬀect on longevity, but longevity has a crowding eﬀect on the ﬁxed
environmental quality ¯ Q.
Turning to ξ,w eh a v eo n en e g a t i v ee ﬀects [1] and a positive one [3].T h e
ﬁrst one [1] is standard and negative; the second one, positive eﬀect [3] says
that by taxing health care, people do not live as long as without such a
tax and this has a relief eﬀect on the ﬁxed quality of environment. In fact,






. In other words, we have, if we abstract from crossed eﬀects [i.e.
∂sc
∂ξ
=0 ], the ﬁrst best Pigouvian tax on health expenditures.
Admittedly, the result - i.e. health care ought to be taxed - obtained
both in the ﬁrst-best and in the second-best (under particular conditions) is
a bit surprising and, as such, has to be qualiﬁed. Subsidizing health care is
often recommended on the grounds of other considerations: redistribution,
externality, etc. The negative eﬀect underlined in this paper is likely to be
dominated by these other considerations.
The two external eﬀects of production and pollution are quite interest-
ing. On prior grounds, one cannot say whether saving ought to be taxed or
subsidized. We know that in the ﬁr s t - b e s ti th a st ob et a x e d .
6 A numerical application
Let us now consider, in the light of numerical examples, the implications of
the present model for public policy. For that purpose, we shall ﬁrst intro-
duce and calibrate functional forms for preferences, production and longevity.
Then, we shall explore the sensitivity of the optimal (second-best) taxes on
capital income and health expenditures - τ∗and ξ
∗- to various parameters of
the model.
6.1 Functional forms














7Under that functional form, the cross derivatives Ucq and Udq are non-negative.
13where β is a time preference factor, whereas γ reﬂects the importance of
consumption with respect to environmental quality (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1). γ is assumed
to be constant across periods, which is a simpliﬁcation, as old agents may
be more or less sensitive to environmental quality than young ones.8 The
parameter σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for
consumption.






with 0 <α<1 and A>0.






where B denotes the ‘natural’ longevity level, that is, its level in the hy-
pothetical case where health expenditures and pollution have no inﬂuence
on longevity (B>0). φ is the elasticity of ht+1 with respect to health
expenditures (φ>0), whereas ψ is the elasticity of ht+1 with respect to
the stock of pollution at time t (ψ<0), denoted here in intensive terms
(i.e. pt = Pt/N).10 In order to capture the intergenerational dimension of
pollution, longevity is here aﬀected by the stock of pollution faced when
being young: individuals, even if they were non-myopic, could choose their
longevity only within a range allowed by previous generations, because some
of its causes - here pt - result from past decisions on which they have no
control.11
6.2 Calibration
Regarding preferences, t h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o rβ is assumed to be equal to 0.30,
which corresponds, given that the length of a full period is 40 years, to a
quarterly subjective discount factor of 0.99. In the light of empirical studies
showing that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is
slightly above unity (see Browning et al, 1999), the parameter σ is ﬁxed
to 0.83, which implies an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 1.25.
8Another non-negligible assumption is that pollution does not enter individual utility
directly, but, only indirectly, through its inﬂuence on longevity ht+1.
9Under φ>0 and ψ<0, that functional form satisﬁes the properties mentioned in
Section 2: hx > 0, hxx < 0, hp < 0 and hpp > 0.
10Given that each cohort is of constant size, this does not have any inﬂuence on the
results.
11This assumption does not aﬀect the conclusions drawn in previous sections, because
these concerned the steady-state, where, by deﬁnition, pt+1 and pt are equal.
14Regarding the parameter γ,w es h a l lﬁrst consider the benchmark case where
the available space does not aﬀect welfare (i.e. γ =1 ), and, in a second
stage, use lower values for γ.
As far as production parameters are concerned, α is ﬁxed to 0.36, in
conformity with the literature (see de la Croix and Michel, 2002), while the
scale parameter A is ﬁxed to 10.
The calibration of pollution parameters δ and η depends on the particular
pollution process under study.12 G i v e nt h a te a c hp e r i o di so fl e n g t h4 0y e a r s ,
it makes sense to assume that δ is relatively high, but its level depends on
what pollution consists of. We shall, as a benchmark, assume that δ is equal
to 0.9 (i.e. 9/10th of the pollution have vanished after a time lag of 40
years). Regarding η, we shall take 0.10 as a benchmark, and consider also
higher values.
Regarding the space available per active person ¯ Q/N, we shall assume
that it is equal to about 3000 square-meters (i.e. equal approximately to
the available space in countries such as the Netherlands). But, in order to
e x p l o r eh o wt h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yi sa ﬀected by the ‘number problem’, we shall
also compute (τ∗,ξ
∗) under a higher population density (i.e. a lower ¯ Q/N).
Finally, as far as the calibration of the longevity function is concerned, we
shall assume that the elasticities of longevity with respect to health spending
φ and pollution ψ are equal respectively to 0.15 and -0.05. Under those
values, assuming that B is equal to 0.30 implies, under k0 equal to 0.1,a n d
under τ =0and ξ =0 , an initial longevity equal to about 65 + 0.25(40) =
75 years.
6.3 Results
Let us now consider the policy to be implemented by a government maxi-
mizing steady-state lifetime welfare subject to the budget constraint. The
government collects a tax τ on capital income, taxes health expenditures at
ar a t eξ, and uses the ﬁscal revenues to fund a transfer a,w h i c hi sr e m i t t e d
to individuals during their ﬁrst period of life. Individuals cannot anticipate
the impact of their health spending on a, and take it as given. Given the ab-
sence of a second-period transfer, the derived optimal policies are second-best
policies.
When choosing their savings and health expenditures, agents do not in-
ternalize the impact of those decisions on pollution and on the available
space. Moreover, we shall assume, for simplicity, that, when making their
12It should be stressed here that the assumed dynamic expression for pollution may not
cover many existing pollution processes, whose dynamics is far more complex.
15decisions, individuals form static expectations for the space available in the
next period.13
To study the sensitivity of the optimal second-best policy (τ∗,ξ
∗),w e
shall ﬁrst focus on parameters describing pollution (i.e. η and δ), and, then,
on preference parameters (i.e. β, γ and σ). For simplicity, we shall, in a ﬁrst
stage, assume that the available space does not aﬀect welfare (i.e. γ =1 ).
As illustrated by Figure 1, lifetime welfare at the steady-state is a non-
monotonic function of the tax on capital income τ.14 For low taxation levels,






























xi = xi* = -0,38
Fig. 1: Steady-state lifetime welfare as a function of τ.
Although the relationship between steady-state lifetime welfare and tax-
ation on capital income has the same inverted-U shape for the three values of
ξ,t h elevel of lifetime welfare is not insensitive to the tax on health spending.
Actually, the computation of lifetime welfare under diﬀerent values of ξ sug-
gests that subsidizing health spending is here socially desirable: the highest
inverted-U curve is obtained under ξ equal to -38 %, so that the optimal
second-best policy involves τ∗ equal to about 4.9, and ξ
∗ equal to -0.38.
Let us now explore how this optimal second-best policy (τ∗,ξ
∗) varies
with the various parameters of this model. For that purpose, we shall present























14Figure 1 is based on A =1 0 ,α=0 .36,β=0 .3,γ=1 ,σ=0 .83,δ=0 .9,η=0 .1,B=
0.3,φ=0 .15 and ψ = −0.05. Initial capital is 0.1. ¯ Q/N = 3000.
16steady-state lifetime welfare as a function of τ under diﬀerent parameters’s
values, while assuming that the tax on health expenditures takes its optimal
level ξ
∗ for each parametrization.
A ﬁrst set of parameters concerns the pollution process. As illustrated
on Figure 2, which shows steady-state lifetime welfare as a function of τ
under low emissions (i.e. η =0 .1), medium emissions (i.e. η =0 .3)a n d
large emissions (i.e. η =0 .5), lifetime welfare is, as expected, lower when
emissions are larger, that is, when η is higher.15 But another important
thing to observe is that the optimal second-best policy is not insensitive
to η: (τ∗,ξ
∗) is equal to (4.9,−0.38) when η equals 0.1, and to respectively
(5,−0.39) and (5.3,−0.41) when η equals 0.3 and 0.5. Thus, higher emissions
lead here to a higher optimal tax on capital income, and to a higher optimal


























low  emissions, xi*=-0,38
mid emissions, xi*=-0,39
high emissions, xi*=-0,41
Fig. 2: Relation between U and τ for diﬀerent η.
O n es h o u l dn o t i c et h a ta s s u m i n gal o w e rδ (i.e. a lower natural absorption
of pollution) has the same eﬀects as a rise of η: it reduces, ceteris paribus,
steady-state lifetime welfare, and implies a higher optimal tax on capital
income, and a higher optimal subsidy on health expenditures.16
But the optimal second-best policy is also sensitive to preference para-
meters β, σ and γ, as we shall now discuss.
15Figure 2 is based on A =1 0 ,α=0 .36,β=0 .3,γ =1 ,σ=0 .83,δ=0 .9,B=0 .3,φ=
0.15 and ψ = −0.05. Initial capital is 0.1. ¯ Q/N = 3000.
16For instance, under the above calibration and η =0 .1, (τ∗,ξ
∗) is equal to (4.9,−0.38)
when δ equals 0.9,a n dt o(5.1,−0.39) when δ equals 0.1.
17The inﬂuence of parameters β and σ on the optimal second-best policy
is shown on Table 1.17 Regarding the impact of β,t h eﬁrst three rows of
T a b l e1i l l u s t r a t et h a tal o w e ri m p a t i e n c et e n d st or a i s es t e a d y - s t a t ec a p i t a l ,
longevity and welfare. From the point of view of public intervention, a higher
β reduces the optimal tax on capital income and the optimal subsidy on
health spending.
Table 1: Optimal policy (τ∗,ξ
∗) and preference parameters
βσγτ ∗ ξ
∗ k∗ x∗ p∗ h∗ U∗
0.30 0.83 1.00 4.90 -0.38 0.396 0.468 0.796 0.271 8.452
0.40 0.83 1.00 3.50 -0.25 0.628 0.613 0.940 0.280 8.853
0.50 0.83 1.00 2.70 -0.15 0.887 0.764 1.064 0.287 9.217
0.30 0.70 1.00 4.40 -0.59 0.362 0.309 0.771 0.255 5.889
0.30 0.83 1.00 4.90 -0.38 0.396 0.468 0.796 0.271 8.452
0.30 0.95 1.00 4.90 0.16 0.487 1.198 0.857 0.311 23.693
Regarding the inﬂuence of σ on the optimal second-best public interven-
tion, Table 1 suggests that a higher σ (i.e. a lower elasticity of intertemporal
substitution) tends to reduce the size of the optimal subsity on health ex-
penditures, and may turn it into a tax. However, its impact on τ∗ is more
ambiguous.
Turning now to the parameter γ, which captures the importance, in wel-
fare terms, of consumption with respect to the available space per person,
Table 2 suggests that reducing γ leaves the optimal tax on capital income
τ∗ unchanged.18 However, assigning a higher weight to environmental qual-
ity tends, ceteris paribus, to reduce the subsidy on health expenditures, and
turns it into a tax (i.e. ξ
∗ > 0). That result is not surprising: the lower γ
is, the larger is the welfare loss due to the non-internalization by agents of
the inﬂuence of health spending on the available space (through the rise in
longevity). Such a larger welfare loss must necessarily lead, ceteris paribus,
to a higher tax rate ξ
∗.
The second part of Table 2 shows the optimal policy (τ∗,ξ
∗) when the
available space per active person ¯ Q/N is reduced to a level equal to 1000
17Table 1 is based on A =1 0 ,α =0 .36,δ =0 .9,η =0 .1,B =0 .3,φ =0 .15 and
ψ = −0.05. Initial capital is 0.1. ¯ Q/N =3 0 0 0 .
18Table 2 is based on A =1 0 ,α =0 .36,δ =0 .9,η =0 .1,B =0 .3,φ =0 .15 and
ψ = −0.05. Initial capital is 0.1.
18square-meters, which corresponds approximately to the space availability in
a highly densiﬁed country like Bangladesh (where the population density is
about 1018 persons per square kilometer).19
Table 2: Optimal policy (τ∗,ξ
∗) for diﬀerent γ and ¯ Q/N.
βσ γ τ ∗ ξ
∗ k∗ x∗ p∗ h∗ U∗
¯ Q/N =3 0 0 0
0.30 0.83 1.00 4.90 -0.38 0.396 0.468 0.796 0.271 8.452
0.30 0.83 0.75 4.90 -0.19 0.421 0.533 0.814 0.276 10.979
0.30 0.83 0.50 4.90 0.14 0.455 0.644 0.836 0.283 14.246
¯ Q/N =1 0 0 0
0.30 0.83 1.00 4.90 -0.38 0.396 0.468 0.796 0.271 8.452
0.30 0.83 0.75 4.90 -0.19 0.421 0.533 0.814 0.276 10.478
0.30 0.83 0.50 4.90 0.14 0.455 0.644 0.836 0.283 12.976
As shown by the last column of Table 2, postulating a smaller available
space ¯ Q/N tends, ceteris paribus, to lower steady-state lifetime welfare, ex-
cept when γ equals 1 (i.e. environmental quality does not inﬂuence welfare).
However, reducing the available space does not, under the postulated func-
tional forms, aﬀect the optimal second-best policy (τ∗,ξ
∗),w h i c hi st h es a m e
under ¯ Q/N equal to 3000 and 1000. Thus, although a smaller space reduces
welfare, it does not aﬀect the optimal second-best public intervention.
7 Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to study the design of the optimal long-run public
intervention in an economy where longevity, which is inﬂuenced negatively
by pollution due to production, tends, by raising population density, to aﬀect
environmental quality. For that purpose, we developed a two-period OLG
model, where agents do not, when choosing their savings and health expen-
ditures, internalize the impact of their decisions on the natural environment.
As this was shown with general functional forms for production, prefer-
ences and longevity, the ﬁrst-best public intervention in that economy in-
volves, besides adequate transfers leading to the Golden rule, a positive tax-
ation of capital income, as well as a positive taxation of health expenditures.
Whereas the former pigouvian tax allows the internalization of the pollution
externality, the latter corrects agents’s tendency to overspend in health.
19Sources: INSEE (2006).
19Regarding the optimal public policy under a limited set of instruments
(including the two taxes and a ﬁrst-period transfer), it was shown that the
optimal second-best levels of the tax on capital income and on health spend-
ing can hardly be signed with certainty, but, rather, depend on various fac-
tors, such as the intensity of preferences for environmental quality and the
pollution process.
The sensitivity of the optimal second-best policy to those factors was also
illustrated by means of numerical examples based on a time-additive CES
utility function, a Cobb-Douglas production technology, and a longevity ex-
hibiting constant elasticities with respect to health spending and pollution.
As one may expect, pollution processes involving higher emissions tend, ce-
teris paribus, to raise the optimal second-best tax on capital income. More-
over, increasing the importance of environmental quality as a determinant of
human welfare tends to turn health care subsidies into a tax.
While this paper does not draw precise conclusions about what public
policy should be in the actual world, this allows us, however, to highlight
that public intervention should take into account the multiple relationships
between production, longevity and the environment, because these determine
the corrections to be made by governments. Given the complexity of those
relations, it cannot be overemphasized that this paper is only a ﬁrst step in
the study of optimal policy under endogenous longevity and environment.
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